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Abstract
Promoting cooperation is an intellectual challenge in the social sciences, for which the iterated Prisoners’
Dilemma (IPD) is a fundamental framework. The traditional view that there exists no simple ultimatum
strategy whereby one player can unilaterally control the share of the surplus has been challenged by a
new class of zero-determinant (ZD) strategies raised by Press and Dyson. In particular, the extortionate
strategies can subdue the opponent and obtain higher scores. However, no empirical evidence has yet been
found to support this theoretical finding. In a long-run laboratory experiment of the iterated Prisoners’
Dilemma pairing each human subject with a computer co-player, we demonstrate that the extortionate
strategy indeed outperforms the generous strategy against human subjects. Our results show that the
extortionate strategy achieves higher scores than the generous strategy, the extortionate strategy promotes
the cooperation rate to a similar level as the generous strategy does, and the human subjects’ cooperation
rates in both the extortionate and generous treatments are increasing over time. While our results imply
that the human subjects cared about their earnings as well as fairness or reciprocity, we do observe that
subjects learned to become increasingly cooperative over time to increase their own monetary payoffs.
Our experiments provide the first laboratory evidence in support of the Press-Dyson theory.
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Significance Statement
(1) The ZD strategies successfully unilaterally enforced a linear relationship between human players’
scores and the scores of the computer players playing the ZD strategies, as predicted by Press and
Dyson. (2) The extortionate ZD strategists obtained significantly higher scores than the generous ZD
strategists. Half of the extortionate ZD strategists even got scores higher than those resulting from
mutual cooperation. (3) The human subjects’ cooperation rate against the extortionate ZD strategy
is as high as that against the generous ZD strategy. Moreover, the human subjects’ cooperation rates
increase over time in both treatments. (4) Although human subjects display some degree of conditionally
cooperative behaviors, most of them are evolutionary and gradually accede to the extortion in the long
run. Consequently, the extortionate ZD strategy outperforms the generous ZD strategy in the long run.
21 Introduction
Promoting cooperation under adverse short-term individual incentives is an important social challenge,
and the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma (IPD) has been widely studied as the game theoretic framework
representing this issue [1–7]. In a one-shot two-person prisoners’ dilemma, there are two pure strategies:
cooperate (C) and defect (D). Each player receives R if they mutually cooperate; each player receives P
if they mutually defect; if one player cooperates and the other defects, the defector receives T and the
cooperator receives S, where T > R > P > S guarantees that in this game the commonly used solution
concept Nash equilibrium, is mutual defection, while 2R > T + S implies that mutual cooperation is
actually the socially best outcome.
Since the computerized tournaments conducted by Axelrod [3, 4], kindness and fairness appeared to
yield the best chance to promote and sustain cooperation. A substantial number of studies suggest
that reciprocity makes mutual cooperation feasible [8–13], and is a favorable strategy in an evolutionary
setting [14–17].
Surprisingly, Press and Dyson recently discovered a class of so-called zero-determinant (ZD) strategies
which allow a player to unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between his score and that of his opponent
[18]. In particular, a subclass of ZD strategies, namely the extortionate strategies, have the potential to
guarantee that the extortioner’s own surplus exceeds the opponent’s surplus by a fixed percentage, by
making it optimal for the opponent to cooperate. This means that it is possible to maintain cooperation
and pursue self-interest at same time. In addition, an extortioner can earn a score exceeding that from
constant mutual cooperation. This new finding by Press and Dyson has also stimulated many researchers
to further investigate the performance of ZD strategies in various situations [19–25]. The key insight
of the Press-Dyson theory remains that, if a human being’s behavior is developed in an evolutionary
manner, he will tend to become more cooperative over time, and if so, the ZD strategist will achieve her
maximum possible score by exploiting this cooperative tendency of her opponent [18].
In spite of these significant developments in the literature, the empirical verification of the theory is
rather nontrivial. Up to now, there is only one published study which tests the Press-Dyson theory in a
laboratory experiment environment. Hilbe et al [23] provided experimental evidence on performances of
different ZD strategies played by computers against human subjects. They specified the ZD strategists to
play the extortionate strategy or the generous strategy against human subjects in the context of IPD, in
which the extortioner is predicted to earn a higher score based on the Press and Dyson’s theory. They find
that extortion subdues human players, although generosity turns out to be the more profitable strategy,
and furthermore, that the cooperation rate of human co-players against extortionate ZD strategies is
only half of that against generous ZD strategies. In other words, generosity appears to be the winning
strategy after all. The experimental results by Hilbe et al [23] thus appear to refute the Press-Dyson
theory, and has inspired other studies [26]. This apparent inconsistency between theory and experimental
results calls for a closer examination of the discrepancy [27].
It is worth noting that in the experiment by Hilbe et al [23], it was not made known to the human
subjects that they were actually playing against a strategy executed by a computer program. Due to this
feature of their experimental design, it is arguable that effects of two factors, the ZD strategies themselves
and the nature of the other player, cannot be well-distinguished in their results. In the real world, a
strategy can be executed by a human individual, but can also be executed by a non-human mechanism.
For example, a ZD strategist can be understood as an institution which has its own regularities in
generosity or extortion when interacting with human beings. In the view of Darwinism, institutions are
competitive and the winning institution (ZD strategist) will be selected based on the performance. To
begin to test the theory cleanly, we should explore the performance of the strategy independently of
potentially more complicated social influences such as human players’ attitudes and intentions towards
other human players. In other words, which ZD strategy performs better when playing against human
subjects who know that they are facing interaction with a “strategized” computer instead of a human
being.
3Another factor that might have led to the inconsistency between the Press-Dyson theory and the
experimental result by Hilbe et al [23], could be insufficient learning opportunities for the human subjects
in their experimental design. As is known, ZD strategies are complicated. A ZD strategy is described by
the probabilities of cooperation given the four possible outcomes of the previous round: p = (p1, p2, p3, p4),
where pi, i ∈ (1, 2, 3, 4) is the probability of cooperation given the previous outcome CC, CD, DC and DD,
respectively. It is well understood that a strategy involving uncertainty (and stochastic actions) takes
longer time to reveal itself than a pure strategy. The 60-round sessions implemented in the experiments
by Hilbe et al [23], may not be long enough for people to learn the details of a ZD strategy. Lengthier
sessions which can accommodate learning are often more ideal when subjects are facing probabilistic
environments [28–34].
In order to test the true performance of the ZD strategies, we conducted a laboratory experiment
of iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, which provided the human subjects with a rich learning experience over
the course of 500 rounds, and made it clearly known to the subjects that they are playing against
a strategized computer. Our results show that the extortionate ZD strategy indeed outperforms the
generous ZD strategy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first experimental evidence which supports
the predictions of the Press-Dyson theory.
2 Experiment and Results
For comparison of performance of different ZD strategies, we designed a laboratory experiment, in which,
every human player faced a fixed ZD strategy implemented by a computer program for 500 rounds. Every
human player was informed that the opponent will be a computer program.
The payoff matrix used in our experiment is shown in Fig 1 which is the same as in Refs [18,23]. Both
players receive 3 if they mutually cooperate, both players receive 1 if they mutually defect, the defector
receives 5 and the cooperator receives 0 if one player cooperates and the other defects.
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Figure 1. Payoff matrix. If both players cooperate (C), each player receives 3, if one cooperates and
one defects (D), cooperator receives 0 and defecter receives 5, if both defect, each player receives 1.
We employed two treatments, extortionate ZD strategy (ES) and generous ZD strategy (GS). Ta-
ble 1 summarizes the experimental design. For ES, the four conditional cooperation probabilities are
(p1, p2, p3, p4) = (0.692, 0.000, 0.538, 0.000), and for GS the probabilities are (p1, p2, p3, p4) = (1.000,
0.182, 1.000, 0.364). In addition, ES defects in the first round and GS cooperates in the first round.
These are the same as the strong extortionate ZD strategy and strong generous ZD strategy in Hilbe et
al [23], respectively.
Altogether 64 graduate and undergraduate students participated in the experiment with each treat-
ment consisting of 32 participants. For further details on the implentation of the experiment, see the
Materials and Methods section.
4Table 1. Experimental design
Treatment Number of human co-players p0 p1 p2 p3 p4 slope (s)
E 32 0.000 0.692 0.000 0.538 0.000 1/3
G 32 1.000 1.000 0.182 1.000 0.364 1/3
E, extortion; G, generosity.
ZD strategies are defined by five probabilities: p0, the probability to cooperate in the first round, p1, p2, p3, p4
the four conditional cooperation probabilities given the previous round’s outcome CC, CD, DC, and DD,
respectively, from the ZD strategist’s view. Extortionate strategies do not cooperate in the first round, and they
never cooperate after mutual defection. Generous strategies, on the other hand, cooperate in the first round and
they always cooperate after mutual cooperation. The parameter s determines the slope of the predicted payoff
relationship: a slope of s = 1/3 implies that for each additional point that the ZD strategist earns, the human
co-player’s additional payoff is 1/3.
Table 2. Summary of the experimental results
Scores per round Cooperation rateTreatment number of player
Human ZD strategist Human ZD strategist
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
ES 32 1.703 0.200 2.943 0.511 0.684 0.198 0.436 0.137
GS 32 2.746 0.260 2.263 0.788 0.645 0.349 0.741 0.245
2.1 Comparison of the score performance of two ZD strategies
Table 2 exhibits the overview of the experimental results and Figure 2 shows the resulting average scores
over all 500 rounds of the game for each of the two treatments. On average, the extortioners earn
2.943± 0.511 (mean ± s.d.) scores per round and generous strategists earn 2.263± 0.788 (mean ± s.d.)
scores per round. Extortionate strategists earn significantly higher scores than the generous counterparts
(Mann-Whitney test, nE = nG = 32, z = 4.196, p < 0.000). The average scores for extortionate
strategists are 30% higher than generous strategists. Furthermore, half of the extortioners even earned
scores higher than 3 per round, which is the score associated with constant mutual cooperation. On the
contrary, no generous strategist earned scores exceeding 3. This result matched the theoretical prediction
of ZD strategies [18] well. For further details, see SI.
2.2 Comparison of the effectiveness of promoting cooperation between two
ZD strategies
Table 2 also displays the overall cooperation rates. On average, the cooperation rate of human co-players
is 0.684± 0.198 (mean ± s.d.) in ES treatment and 0.645± 0.349 (mean ± s.d.) in GE treatment. There
is no significant difference between the two treatments (Mann-Whitney test, nE = nG = 32, z = 0.537,
p = 0.591).
In accordance with the similarity in cooperation rates, the two ZD strategies also generate similar
dynamical patterns. Figure 3 shows the dynamical cooperation rate of human subjects for each treatment.
The cooperation rate in each treatment starts from a relatively lower point then follows an increasing
path. For the ES treatment, compared with the cooperation rate 0.563± 0.221 (mean ± s.d.) in the first
100 rounds, the cooperation rate 0.757±0.220 (mean ± s.d.) in the last 100 rounds is significantly higher
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n = 32, z = 4.207, p < 0.000). For the GS treatment, compared with the
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Figure 2. Average scores across the two treatments for human subjects and the ZD
strategies. The scores for the extortionate strategy (red filled bar) are higher than the generous
strategy (green filled bar). Three grey stars indicate significance at the level α = 0.001 (Mann-Whitney
test, nE = nG = 32). In terms of average scores, while the extortioners stay ahead of their human
co-players (red empty bar), the generous strategists are left behind their human opponents (green
empty bar). The error bars indicate the standard errors.
cooperation rate 0.513± 0.327 (mean ± s.d.) in the first 100 rounds, the cooperation rate 0.716± 0.386
(mean ± s.d.) in the last 100 rounds is also significantly higher (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n = 32,
z = 3.314, p < 0.000).
Our results suggest that the effectiveness of promoting cooperative behaviors is similar between the
extortionate strategy and the generous strategy. These results strongly support the theoretical prediction
of ZD strategies [18]. A theoretical explanation for the increasing trend in the cooperation rate is provided
in SI.
2.3 The score relationship between ZD strategies and human players
Table 2 exhibits the average scores per round for both human subjects and computer programs, and
Figure 2 illustrates the results. The extortioners earn higher scores than their human co-players (Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-rank test, nE = nhuman = 32, z = 4.937, p < 0.000). On the contrary, the generous
ZD strategists earn lower scores than their human co-players (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test,
nG = nhuman = 32, z = 4.910, p < 0.000). In addition, the relationship of the scores between ZD
strategists and human co-players follows the linear relationship prediction, as shown in Figure 4. These
results suggest that ZD strategies can indeed unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between human
players’ scores and their own scores. These results are consistent with the theoretical prediction of the
ZD strategies (for more details, see SI).
3 Discussion
Our long-run experiment showed that the extortionate strategy outperformed the generous strategy
significantly. The extortionate strategy earned higher scores than the generous strategy while promoting
the human co-player’s cooperative behavior at the same level of effectiveness. We also found that the
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Figure 3. Human cooperation rates over the course of the game. The graph shows the
fraction of cooperating human subjects for each round for ES treatment (left) and GS treatment (right).
Dots represent the average human cooperation rate at a round within a treatment, with the shaded
areas depicting the 95% confidence interval. The rising trends of cooperation behaviour appear in both
treatments (Spearman’s rank correlation, for ES, n = 500, ρ = 0.556, p < 0.000; for GS, n =500,
ρ = 0.757, p < 0.000).
ZD strategies was successful in unilaterally enforcing a linear relationship between human players’ scores
and their own scores. These findings confirm the ZD theory [18] precisely. In particular, half of the
extortionate strategists earned scores higher than 3 per round on average, indicating that the extortionate
strategist can in fact earn higher payoffs compared to the case of constant mutual cooperation.
Our results are quite different from the previous experimental investigation of Hilbe et al [23]. In their
experiment, the generous strategies earned higher scores than the extortionate strategies, the human co-
players’ cooperation rate in the extortion treatment is only half of that in the generosity treatment,
and the rising trend in the cooperation rate appears only in the generosity treatments. Based on the
differences between our results and theirs, we provided evidence to support the ZD theory while their
results appeared to raise questions about the theory’s empirical validity.
As mentioned above, our experimental design has two key different features from the previous in-
vestigation [23]. First, we informed subjects that they are playing against a computer while the same
information was not provided to the subjects in the previous investigation. Second, we provided 500
rounds of play while the previous study provided 60 rounds of play. Human subjects may need lengthy
periods of time in order to understand the decision problem or strategic issue they face (see Chapter 1
in [35]).
As the previous investigation did not make the nature of the opponent (being a computer or a
human being) apparent to human subjects [23], the authors fully ascribed the inconsistency between the
theoretical predictions and the experimental results to a preference for conditional cooperation [36–38]
or fairness [39–41]. Existing literature has found that human individuals in general show and acquire a
stronger sense of fairness when they are playing against other human individuals compared to playing
against computer programs [42, 43]. Hilbe et al show that people cooperate more when the opponent
cooperated in the previous round [23]. Human subjects in their study would defect when they played
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Figure 4. Theoretical prediction for the expected scores and experimental performance.
The grey-shaded area depicts the space of possible scores for the ZD strategy implemented by the
computer programme (x axis) and the human co-player (y axis). The red (green) line corresponds to
the theoretical prediction for the expected scores of extortion (generosity), respectively, and the open
red (green) circles indicate the outcome of the ES (GS) treatment, respectively. Each cycle indicates a
pair of a ZD strategy and a human player.
against the extortionate strategies, because the extortioner often defected. We also found the propensity
of conditional cooperation in our experiment where the human subjects knew for sure that they faced a
computer program. Human subjects’ cooperation rates were higher if the ZD strategists cooperated in
the previous round than otherwise. On average, human cooperation rates were 78.45% if the extortionate
strategist cooperated in the previous round, and 60.83% otherwise, and 66.49% if the generous strategist
cooperated in the previous round, and 41.20% otherwise. However, in our experiment, we noticed that
even if the opponent defected in the previous round, the cooperation rates were still high, especially in
the ES treatment. This cannot be explained by conditional cooperation. The requirement for the human
co-player to earn high scores is precisely to cooperate unconditionally.
We also observed that the increasing cooperation trend lasted for half of the 500 rounds in both
treatments. It involves a learning process for the human subjects to realize that cooperation is beneficial.
In the experiment, a human subject might have found that, for each of the four possible previous outcomes
CC, CD, DC and DD, she/he had two choices C and D, then she/he could try to figure out in total eight
conditional scores. Theoretically, the results are shown in Table 3, given that a ZD strategist has a unique
conditional strategy p1, p2, p3, p4. For human subjects, if any of the possible outcomes in the previous
outcome are considered, strategy D forever dominates strategy C in both treatments. This might be the
reason that the cooperation rates during early stages are relatively lower. However, as time goes on, an
intelligent and careful player would find that the lowest scores in the first two conditions are higher than
the highest scores in the second two conditions in both treatments (a theoretical analysis will be provided
in SI), and the right choice is C. Thus, the cooperation rates followed a gradually increasing process.
The result also indicates that one may not be able to find evidence to support the ZD theory [18] if the
number of rounds of play is not sufficiently large.
In economics, a rational agent is assumed to maximize her/his own benefit, and the ZD strategies have
the feature of ensuring that the opponent’s best response is to fully cooperate. While our results suggest
that the human subjects cared about their earnings as well as fairness or reciprocity, we do observe that
8Table 3. Human’s expected scores of conditional strategies.
CC CD DC DD
Treatment Strategy p1 p3 p2 p4
C 2.076 1.614 0.000 0.000
ES D 3.768 3.152 1.000 1.000
C 3.000 3.000 0.546 1.092
GS D 5.000 5.000 1.728 2.456
CC, CD, DC and DD are the previous outcomes from the human subject’s view. For the details of the
calculation, see SI.
subjects learned to become increasingly cooperative over time to increase their own monetary payoffs.
Evolution has an essential impact on both human subjects and the ZD strategist. As predicted by Press-
Dyson theory, in our laboratory experiments we have observed human behavior evolving towards full
cooperation, while the extortionate strategy outperforms generosity and wins by social selection.
4 Materials and Methods
4.1 Data source and Experimental setting
The data we used here come from our laboratory experiments which were conducted at The Experimental
Social Science Laboratory of Zhejiang University, on 19 and 21 November 2014. A total of 64 undergrad-
uate and graduate students from various disciplines were recruited to participate in the experiment with
each of them only participating once. In total, we collected 64000 observations of individual decision
making, consisting of choices of human subjects and ZD strategies implemented by computer programs.
There were two treatments in total, one was extortionate ZD strategy (ES) and the other was generous
ZD strategy (GS). For each treatment, there were 32 participants with half of them being male and the
other half being female. Each experimental session consisted of 4 pairs of human players and computers,
and in total there were 16 sessions in the set of experiments. On average, each session lasted for 1 hour.
During the experiment, the player earned scores according to the payoff matrix (see Figure 1) and their
choices. After the experiment, the sum of scores were converted to cash according to an exchange rate
and paid to the subjects. The average earning is about 50 Yuan RMB including the 5 Yuan show-up fee.
Before the formal experiment, the subjects practiced with a matching pennies game against a computer
to get acquainted with the laboratory setting. They were then assigned a set of materials including an
instruction manual (see SI), an informed consent form and a recording chart for their use, and they
played the game in an small isolated room with a computer. Oral instructions were also given. They
made decisions by clicking the option C or D on the screen. The software for the experiment was designed
by the authors. No communication was allowed, and the subjects were asked to put their mobile phones
in mute and sealed in an envelope until the end of the session. Considering the complexity of the ZD
strategies, we provided human subjects with paper and pen to record their decision choices and scores
round by round. The human subjects were told that they would play a game with a fixed computer
program for more than 500 rounds, and after the 500th round, the game will end after each round
with a probability of 0.1. This setting allows us to get 500 rounds data for each subject while avoiding
end-of-game effects [44].
94.2 Statistical methods
Throughout the paper, we use two-tailed non-parametric tests for our statistical analysis. With each
iterated game between a human co-player and the computer as our statistical unit, we have 32 independent
observations for each of the two treatments and each of two players (a computer and a human player).
Specifically, we used Mann-Whitney test for the comparison between treatments, Wilcoxon signed-rank
test for the comparison within a treatment. In addition, we use Spearmans rank correlation test for trend
test.
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